WHERE DOES TURNOUT DECLINE COME FROM?*

André Blais, Université de Montréal
Elisabeth Gidengil, McGill University
Neil Nevitte, University of Toronto
Richard Nadeau, Université de Montréal

André Blais
Département de science politique
Université de Montréal
C.P. 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville
Montréal, Canada
H3C 3J7

Tel : 514-343-7349
Fax : 514-343-2360
Email : andre.blais@umontreal.ca

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ABSTRACT

The paper looks at the socio-demographic sources of turnout decline in Canada. The analysis is based on the Canadian Election Studies that have been conducted between 1968 and 2000 and leads to the following conclusions:

1. There is a small period effect which suggests that the propensity to vote has declined marginally (by about three percentage points) in all groups.
2. There are substantial life-cycle effects, that is, turnout shifts over time within a given cohort as members of that cohort grow older. Turnout increases by about 15 points from age 20 to age 50, remains stable from 50 to 70, and slightly declines thereafter. These life-cycle effects, however, do not explain the recent decline in turnout.
3. There are powerful generation effects, that is, turnout differs among the various cohorts even when we compare them at the same stage of their life cycle. Turnout is about 20 points lower among the most recent generation than among pre-baby-boomers. This is the main reason why turnout has declined in Canada.
4. The most recent generations are less prone to vote in good part because they pay less attention to politics and because they are less likely to adhere to the norm that voting is not only a right but also a moral duty. The decline in turnout thus reflects a larger cultural change.
5. Education remains an important correlate of voting. The increase in educational attainment has contributed to dampening the decline in turnout.
6. There is no evidence that the decline in turnout has been more acute among certain sub-groups of the electorate (leaving aside age and education).

WHERE DOES THE TURNOUT DECLINE COME FROM?

Turnout is declining in most established democracies (Blais 2000; Gray and Caul 2000). Where does that decline come from? We focus on the two classic socio-demographic correlates of voting, age and education (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Blais 2000), both of which raise intriguing questions about the sources of declining turnout.

It is an established fact that older citizens are more likely to vote than their younger counterparts. The thorny question is whether this reflects a life cycle or a generation effect. Are younger citizens presently less likely to vote because they happen to be young, the implication being that their propensity to vote will increase as they get older, or because they belong to a generation that is less willing to vote, the implication being that their participation rate will always be lower than that of previous generations? It is only by comparing the turnout of different age cohorts at different points in time that it becomes possible to disentangle life cycle and generation effects, and this is precisely what we do in the present study. We wish to establish whether there is a genuine generation effect in turnout and, if there is one, we wish to determine how much of the overall decline in turnout can be explained by generational replacement.

Education raises an interesting paradox. We know that the better-educated are more prone to vote than the less-educated. We also know that the overall level of educational attainment has increased over time. Theoretically, the latter trend should have produced an increase in electoral participation. Yet, we observe precisely the opposite. Why? One possibility is that the impact of education has decreased over time, that is, the decline in turnout has taken place most dramatically among the better-educated, who may have become more prone to abstain from time to time.

We use the Canadian Election Studies (CES) that have been conducted from 1968 to 2000. We consider a total of nine elections: 1968, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1993, 1997, and 2000.[1] Our pooled data set includes over 25,000 individuals, an average of close to 3,000 per survey. We use as dependent variable reported vote in the post-election survey. As is always the case, voting is overestimated in these surveys, in part because those who are more interested in politics and more inclined to vote are more prone to answer surveys, and in part (in the case of panel studies in which people are interviewed in the campaign and reinterviewed after the election) because participating in an election survey makes people more inclined to vote (Blais and Young 1999; Granberg and Holmberg 1992). Further, there is some misreporting due to social desirability. Social desirability does introduce a bias but the evidence suggests that "it is a general human trait that is uncorrelated with specific characteristics of the respondents" (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995, 292) and that it does not substantially affect the findings.[2] We use weighted data so the turnout figure in our surveys matches the official turnout.[3]

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[1] Only the 1972 election, for which there was no election study, is missing.

[2] For a different view, see Bernstein, Chada, and Montjoy 2001.

[3] We rely on official turnout figures, in which the denominator is the number of registered electors. Many studies now use the age-eligible population as the denominator. This latter measure is particularly problematic in countries with many immigrants such as Canada. To the extent that there are many non-citizens, the measure underestimates the "true" level of turnout. Black (1991) has shown that while the average registered as percent of age-eligible was 92% in the 1980s in Canada, they represent 97% of the

The average turnout over these nine elections is 72%, but it is 74% for the six elections held before 1990 and 67% for the three held after. This seven point drop, a relative decline of 10%, is an important focus of our study. We determine what fraction of that drop (if any) can be accounted by the process of generational replacement and we specify among which subgroups (if any) of the electorate it is concentrated.

Life Cycle, Generation, and Period Effects

We start with the crucial question concerning the relationship between age and voting. We know that age is the best predictor of voting: the older one is, the more likely one is to vote. The challenge is to unravel the meaning of that relationship, to ascertain whether this reflects a life cycle effect, that is, people become more prone to vote as they grow older, a generation effect, that is, members of the new generations are less inclined to vote than those of previous generations at the same age, or both. And to determine this, we need to combine surveys conducted at different points in time, so as to compare the turnout of different cohorts at different stages of their life cycle.

We follow the methodology proposed by Johnston (1989, 1992), which incorporates direct measures of life cycle, generation, and period effects. The life cycle effect is assumed to be a continuous one, and is measured by the age of the respondent. We tested three different forms of relationship: linear, logarithmic, and curvilinear. The linear model assumes that the propensity to vote increases monotonically as one gets older. The logarithmic model assumes that the increase is greater at the beginning of the life cycle and smaller at the end, while the curvilinear model supposes that the propensity to vote decreases in the last stage of the life cycle. We retain the latter model, which is consistent with what we know about life cycle effects on voting (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) and which produced the most satisfactory results.

Generational effects are tapped though a set of dichotomous variables that indicate whether an individual belongs or not to a given cohort group. We distinguish four generations: the pre baby-boomers (born before 1945), the baby-boomers (born between 1945 and 1959), and, among the post baby-boomers, those born in the 1960s (the so-called generation X), and those born in the 1970s. The hypothesis is that the latter generations are less prone to vote and are mainly responsible for the recent drop in turnout.[4]

We finally created two dummy variables to capture period effects, one for the "recent" elections held after 1990, and one for the "seasonal" elections of 1974, which

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age-and-citizenship eligible. As a consequence, turnout based on registered electors appears to be a more reliable measure than turnout based on age-eligible population. The official turnout measure may have become more problematic since 1997, with the move to a new permanent list (see Black 2000; Johnston 2000). It is possible, therefore, that we are slightly overestimating turnout in 1997 and 2000 and, therefore, slightly underestimating the recent drop in electoral participation. The turnout figures for 1980 and 1993 have been adjusted (upward) to take into account the inflated number of registered electors. In both cases, the electoral list had been drawn one year earlier (for the 1979 election and for the 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Accord) and, as a consequence, the names of many people who had died or moved had not been deleted (see Nevitte, Blais, Gidengil, and Nadeau 2000, 166, note 1).

[4] We also tested a typology based on the party system that prevailed at the time a cohort first had the right to vote, along the lines of Johnston (1992; see also Carty, Cross, and Young 2000 and Johnston 2000), but that typology proved less fruitful.

was held in July, and of 1980, which was held in February. Turnout is typically six points lower when the election takes place in the summer[5] or winter (Nevitte, Blais, Gidengil, and Nadeau 2000, 166, note 4).

Table 1 presents the findings. The table confirms the presence of life-cycle, generation, and period effects. Table 2 illustrates the relative and combined import of each, by providing the mean predicted probability of voting for individuals of a given age, belonging to a given generation, before and after 1990.[6]

Table 2 confirms the presence of important life-cycle effects. The propensity to vote increases by 8 to 11 points from age 20 to 30, by 4 or 5 points from age 30 to 40, and by 2 or 3 points from age 40 to 50, stays stable from 50 to 70, and declines by 3 or 4 points from 70 to 80. All in all, the propensity to vote increases by about 15 percentage points from age 20 to age 50. This is clearly a very substantial effect.

Table 2 also confirms the presence of generation effects. At the same age, turnout is 2 or 3 points lower among baby-boomers than among pre-baby-boomers, a very substantial 10 points lower among generation X than among baby-boomers, and another huge 10 points lower among the most recent generation than among generation X. All in all, age being held constant, the propensity to vote decreases by more than 20 points from the oldest to the most recent cohort. These findings clearly indicate that generation effects are at least as important as life-cycle ones.

Table 3 shows that the pattern is basically the same among men and women.[7] In both groups we observe substantial life-cycle and generation effects. There are some slight differences. It is only among women that turnout drops significantly in the later stages of life.[8] Among pre-baby-boomers men are slightly more likely to vote, and among baby-boomers women have a slightly higher turnout. No systematic difference emerges among the most recent generations.

These data enable us to determine to what extent the recent decline in turnout can be imputed to generational or life-cycle effects. Mean turnout was 75% in the four "normal" elections held before 1990 and 67% for the three held after. Could it be that most of that drop is attributable to generational replacement?

The short answer is: yes. The specific contribution of period effects can be ascertained by computing the mean probability of voting when the election is pre and post 1990, holding everything else (age and generation) constant.[9] The simulation

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[5] What matters is probably not summer as such but the presence of the holiday season.

[6] The pre-1990 results concern "normal" elections and exclude the two "abnormal" elections held in summer 1972 and winter 1980. Predicted turnout is 6 to 8 percentage points lower for those two elections.

[7] We pay particular attention to gender for two reasons. First, contrary to the other socio-demographic characteristics, gender is an exogenous variable. Education and income, for instance, are intervening variables that can "explain" why certain age groups or generations have a higher turnout. The question with respect to gender is whether life-cycle, generation, or period effects are qualitatively different for men and women. Second, there is conflicting evidence on whether gender differences with respect to political activity have declined over time in Canada (see Kay, Lambert, Brown, and Curtis 1987; Black and McGlen 1979). It is interesting to see what the pattern looks like when a longer time period is considered and when life-cycle and generation effects are taken into account. The estimations presented in Table 3 are based on separate logit analyses of the impact of age, generation, and periods for men and women.

[8] It could be, however, that this pattern applies only to pre-baby-boomers.

[9] This is obtained by putting every individual at 0 or at 1 on the post-90 variable and keeping intact his/her age and generation and computing the mean predicted probability of voting under the two scenarios (in all

indicates that the mean probability is three points lower in a post 1990 election.[10] The implication is that turnout declined by about three points in all age and cohort groups after 1990. The implication is also that much of the eight point drop after 1990 is *not* a period effect.

The other crucial factor is generational replacement. The relative weight of the four cohorts in the total electorate is quite different in the two periods. The two post-baby-boomer generations represent 44% of the electorate after 1990 and only 11% before, the pre-baby-boomers 24% now, compared to 59% previously. We can compute the mean probability of voting in our sample for a post-1990 election under a scenario in which the relative weight of the various cohorts is set to remain at pre-1990 levels, that is, if pre-baby-boomers constitute 59% of the electorate instead of 24%, and post-baby-boomers 11% instead of 44%. That mean probability would have been 73%, instead of 68%. Most of the eight point drop in the turnout rate, then, flows from the gradual replacement of pre-baby-boomers by post-baby-boomers.

What about life-cycle effects? Table 1 (as well as Tables 2 and 3) unequivocally confirms the presence of strong life-cycle effects. These life-cycle effects do not, however, explain the recent drop in turnout. The reason is simple. The age composition of the electorate has not changed substantially over time. In fact, there has been a slight increase in the relative weight of the middle age groups, who tend to participate the most. As a consequence, life-cycle effects are not the source of declining turnout.

Our analysis thus demonstrates the presence of life-cycle, generation, and period effects. There is a generalized period effect that affects all age groups and cohorts; for every individual the propensity to abstain has increased slightly (by about three percentage points) since 1990. There are also strong life-cycle effects, turnout increasing by about 15 points from age 20 to age 50 or 60, but these effects are unrelated to the recent drop in turnout. And finally there are powerful generational differences, the propensity to vote (at the same age and period) being at least 20 points lower among the most recent cohorts than among the pre-baby-boomers. And the gradual replacement of the latter by the former accounts for most of the turnout gap between pre and post 1990 elections.

Our findings are consistent with those of Lyons and Alexander (2000) and of Miller and Shanks (1996), who show that most of the decline in turnout in American presidential elections is attributable to the process of generational replacement.

Why Is Turnout Lower Among the Most Recent Cohorts?

That interpretation, of course, raises another question: why are the most recent generations less prone to vote than their predecessors? Two broad societal changes seem to have taken place in Canada, and, perhaps, elsewhere. First, younger generations view the act of voting differently. In part because they tend to be less deferential (Nevitte 1996), young people are less wedded to the norm that voting is not only a right but also a citizen duty (Blais 2000). As a consequence, they do not feel morally obliged to vote

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the scenarios, because the contrast is to be drawn between "normal" elections before and after 1990, every individual was put at 0 on the "seasonal election" variable).

[10] The same estimate is obtained when comparing turnout pre and post 1990 within the same age and cohort groups in Table 2.

whenever they are not particularly interested in a given election. Second, younger generations pay less attention to politics (Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau, and Nevitte 2002, ch. 3), perhaps because they tend to attach less importance or value to that field of activity than to others.

Table 4 provides support for that interpretation. The 2000 Canadian election study included a number of questions designed to tap sense of duty. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statements that "it is the duty of every citizen to vote", that "it is important to vote even if my party or candidate has no chance of winning", and that "if I did not vote, I would feel guilty".[11] The study also included a number of questions that measure respondents' level of attention to politics: three questions about the level of attention to election news on television, in the newspapers and on radio, one question about their overall level of political interest and four questions tapping their level of factual political information (the name of the premier in the respondent's province, Canada's Finance Minister, the Prime Minister at the time of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, and the United States capital).[12]

Table 4 shows that sense of duty and level of attention to politics together account for much of the differences between the cohorts. Most importantly, it seems that once these two attitudes are taken into account, there is no longer any significant gap between the generation born in the 60s and the two oldest cohorts. It appears that it is only because they have a weaker sense of duty and because they pay less attention to politics that those born in the 1960s are less likely to vote.

According to Table 4, these two attitudes explain about half of the initial gap between the cohort born in the 70s and the pre-baby-boomers. The most recent cohort has a weaker sense of duty and it pays less attention to politics and these two factors are an important part of the story but other considerations not examined here seem to play.

These findings suggest that the lower turnout among the most recent cohorts reflects a larger cultural change in the level of attention that people pay to politics and in their propensity to think that voting is a moral obligation. This interpretation should ideally be borne out by pooling surveys conducted at different points in time, so as to sort out life-cycle and generational effects. Unfortunately, this is not possible because sense of duty was not tapped in previous Canadian election studies. The cross-sectional evidence is, however, consistent with that interpretation.

The Impact of Education

Education is a classic and powerful determinant of voting. In about every country the better-educated are much more likely to vote than the less-educated, and Canada is no exception. The problem, of course, is why, if this is the case and if the overall level of educational attainment has increased over time, has turnout not increased rather than

[11] Responses to each of the three questions were scaled from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree). The "sense of duty" index is the sum of the scores divided by 3. Cronbach's alpha for the scale is. 63.

[12] The "attention to news" and "political interest" questions were on a scale from 0 to 10 and were transformed to a 0 to 1 scale. All correct answers to the factual information questions were given a score of 1. The "attention to politics" index is the sum of all scores divided by 8. Cronbach's alpha for the scale is .72.

decreased. One possibility that we want to explore is that education has lost some of its leverage recently, that is, that the better-educated are not voting as heavily as in the past.

We first establish the powerful impact of education on voting. We have three educational groups, the better-educated, with a university degree, the less-educated, who have not completed secondary school, and the middle group. The first column of Table 5 confirms that turnout is higher in the first group and lower in the second. Everything else being equal, the propensity to vote is 17 points higher in the first group than in the second.

We also find in our sample that the percentage with a university degree is higher post than pre 1990, and among post-baby-boomers than among the earlier generations. Why, then, has turnout decreased?

To address this question, we need to look at possible interaction effects between education and cohort groups and/or periods. The results of our exploration are presented in column 2 of Table 5. We found a substantial interaction effect with period, and this indicates that the drop in turnout that occurred after 1990 did not affect the better educated.

Table 6 illustrates the implications of this interaction effect. It can be seen in Table 6c that the propensity to vote among those with a university degree is the same before and after 1990. The situation was quite different among the two other educational groups in which turnout typically declined by about five points. The consequence is that the educational gap has considerably widened.[13] Consider the situation of a thirty year old baby-boomer in elections held before 1990. Her predicted probability of voting is 80% if she has a university education and 64% if she has not completed her secondary school, an important gap of 16 points. But compare the situation of those born in 1970 and who were aged 30 at the time of the 2000 election. Their predicted probability of voting is 66% if they have completed a university degree and only 37% if they have not completed their secondary education, a huge gap of 29 points.

According to our findings, therefore, education has been an important factor in dampening the decline in turnout. The better educated overwhelmingly vote if they belong to older generations; their turnout is still relatively high if they are post-baby-boomers. But the situation is quite different among the lesser educated. While a good majority used to cast a vote, only one out of three or four now votes among those born in the 1970s. The increase in educational attainment has prevented turnout from decreasing even more.

In short, education remains a powerful determinant of voting, in fact it is even more powerful than it used to be, at least in Canada (and the United States; see note 11). We have thus found one group where turnout has not declined, that is, the better-educated. Note, however, that generational effects are present: the new cohorts of better-educated citizens vote less than their predecessors. The point is that the better educated baby-boomers and pre-baby-boomers vote as much as they used to while their less educated counterparts vote less. And the overall increase in educational attainment has contributed to dampening the decline in turnout. The implication is that turnout will decline more sharply unless levels of formal education continue to rise.

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[13] Again, a similar pattern is observed in the United States by Lyon and Alexander (2000) and Miller and Shanks (1996).

The Impact of Other Socio-Demographic Characteristics

The last stage of our analysis examines the impact of other socio-demographic characteristics to see whether turnout has declined more significantly among certain subgroups of the electorate.

Table 7 incorporates the following additional socio-demographic characteristics: gender, income, religiosity, marital status, unionization, ethnicity, immigration, and region. The findings confirm that the propensity to vote is higher among those with higher income, who are married and more religious, who were born in Canada and who belong to an union, and lower among those of non-European origin and living in the Western provinces. Turnout is also slightly higher among men.[14] The two most important correlates of voting, after age and education, are income and religiosity.

Have any of these socio-demographic characteristics become more (or less) important since 1990? We have tested for potential interaction effects between each of these variables and our post-1990 dummy variable. The outcome of these tests is simple and easy to report. We found no significant interaction effect except for the fact that the decline in turnout after 1990 is more acute in the central province of Ontario. There is no evidence that the decline in turnout has been more substantial, or more muted, in certain subgroups of the electorate.[15]

A comparison of Tables 5 and 7 indicates that generational effects are somewhat reduced when additional socio-demographic characteristics are considered.[16] This indicates that some of these characteristics "explain" in part the generational gap. It is in part because the more recent generations tend to be less religious and that more of them are of non-European origin, in particular, that they are more likely to abstain. This is, however, only part of the story. Table 7 shows that, even after controlling for all these socio-demographic variables, powerful generational differences remain.

Certainly, the propensity to vote is related to a host of socio-demographic variables, the most important being religiosity and income. And some of the generational gap flows from declining religiosity among recent generations. But there is no evidence that the decline in turnout was particularly acute among certain segments of the electorate.

Conclusion

Our objective has been to look at the socio-demographic sources of turnout decline in Canada. To that effect we have pooled nine Canadian Election Studies conducted from 1968 to 2000. Our analysis leads to the following conclusions:

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[14] The gender difference becomes (marginally) significant only if we incorporate religiosity into our model. Women are more religious than men and it is in good part because of their greater religiosity that they are as likely to vote as men. At a given level of religiosity, men are slightly more inclined to vote.

[15] This conclusion applies obviously only to socio-demographic characteristics other than age and education.

[16] The baby-boomer coefficient slips from -.3797 to -.1946, that of generation 60s from -.8842 to -.5837, and that of generation 70s from -1.1774 to -.8253. Note that period effects get larger.

1. There is a small period effect which suggests that the propensity to vote has declined marginally (by about three percentage points) in all groups.
2. There are substantial life-cycle effects, turnout increasing by about 15 points from age 20 to age 50, remaining stable from 50 to 70, and slightly declining thereafter. These life-cycle effects, however, do not explain the recent decline in turnout.
3. There are powerful generation effects, turnout being about 20 points lower among the most recent generation than among pre-baby-boomers. This is the main reason why turnout has declined in Canada.
4. The most recent generations are less prone to vote in good part because they pay less attention to politics and because they are less likely to adhere to the norm that voting is a moral duty. The decline in turnout thus reflects a larger cultural change.
5. Education remains an important correlate of voting. The increase in educational attainment has contributed to dampening the decline in turnout.
6. There is no evidence that the decline in turnout has been more acute among certain sub-groups of the electorate (leaving aside age and education).

These patterns are consistent with those that have been reported in the United States. Whether the same story applies to European countries remains to be seen.

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Table 1. Logit Analysis of the Impact of Age, Generation and Periods on the Propensity to Vote, 1968-2000

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Vote Participation	
	B	(s.e.)
Age	.0669*	(.0061)
Age^2	-.0005*	(.0001)
Baby-boomer	-.1576*	(.0514)
Generation 1960s	-.6120*	(.0718)
Generation 1970s	-.9261*	(.0990)
Period post-1990	-.1643*	(.0431)
Summer/Winter	-.3213*	(.0417)
Constant	-.2790	(.1630)
N	2514	
Pseudo R^2	.0493	
Log likelihood	-14288.358	

*: $p<.01$

Table 2. Predicted Turnout According to Age, Generation and Periods, 1968-2000

	Age						
	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
Period Pre-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	77	81	83	83	81	78
Baby-boomers	66	74	78	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	55	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Period Post-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	-	-	80	81	79	75
Baby-boomers	-	-	75	78	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	-	62	66	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	43	52	-	-	-	-	-
Period: Summer/Winter							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	70	75	78	78	76	72
Baby-boomers	58	67	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	47	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 3. Predicted Turnout According to Age, Generation and Period for Men and Women, 1968-2000

	Age						
	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
Men							
Period Pre-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	78	81	83	84	85	84
Baby-boomers	67	72	76	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	57	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Period Post-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	-	-	82	83	84	83
Baby-boomers	-	-	74	77	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	-	60	65	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	43	49	-	-	-	-	-
Period: Summer/Winter							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	73	76	79	80	80	80
Baby-boomers	60	66	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	49	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Women							
Period Pre-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	75	80	82	82	79	72
Baby-boomers	65	75	80	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	54	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Period Post-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	-	-	79	78	75	67
Baby-boomers	-	-	76	79	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	-	60	67	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	43	55	-	-	-	-	-
Period: Summer/Winter							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	68	74	77	76	73	65
Baby-boomers	57	68	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	46	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 4. Logit Analysis of the Impact of Generation, Sense of Duty and Attention to Politics on the Propensity to Vote, 2000

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable : Vote Participation			
	B	(s.e.)	B	(s.e)
Baby-boomer	-0.5695**	(.2843)	-.2731	(.3090)
Generation 1960s	-1.0508*	(.2947)	-.4715	(.3314)
Generation 1970s	-1.9324*	(.2772)	-1.3023*	(.3113)
Sense of duty			5.6670*	(.5483)
Attention to politics			3.3808*	(.5001)
Constant	2.9741	(.2336)	-3.2544	(.5244)
N	1378		1378	
Pseudo R^2	.0449		.1753	
Log likelihood	920.478		713.673	

*: p<.01; **: p<.05

Table 5. Logit Analysis of the Impact of Age, Generation, Periods and Education on the Propensity to Vote, 1968-2000

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable : Vote Participation			
	B	(s.e.)	B	(s.e)
Age	.0614*	(.0063)	.0599*	(.0063)
Age^2	-.0005*	(.0001)	-.0005*	(.0001)
Baby-boomer	-.3759*	(.0534)	-.3797*	(.0533)
Generation 1960s	-.8611*	(.0741)	-.8842*	(.0743)
Generation 1970s	-1.1580*	(.1013)	-1.1774*	(.1015)
Period post-1990	-.2950*	(.0443)	-.3498*	(.0457)
Summer/Winter	-.3539*	(.0426)	-.3444*	(.0425)
Lesser Educated	-.6087*	(.0356)	-.6283*	(.0359)
Better Educated	.3548*	(.0453)	.1558*	(.0604)
Better Educated x Post-1990	-		.4132*	(.0866)
Constant	.2005	(.1672)	.2737	(.1680)
N	25007		25007	
Pseudo R^2	.0665		.0672	
Log likelihood	-13903.507		-13892.085	

*: $p<.01$

Table 6a. Predicted Turnout According to Age, Generation, Period and Education, 1968-2000

	Age						
	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
Lesser Educated							
Period Pre-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	73	77	79	80	78	75
Baby-boomers	56	64	70	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	44	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Period Post-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	-	-	73	73	72	68
Baby-boomers	-	-	62	65	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	-	44	49	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	29	37	-	-	-	-	-
Period: Summer/Winter							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	65	70	73	74	72	68
Baby-boomers	48	56	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	36	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 6b. Predicted Turnout According to Age, Generation, Period and Education, 1968-2000

	Age						
	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
Middle Educated							
Period Pre-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	83	86	88	88	87	85
Baby-boomers	71	77	81	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	59	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Period Post-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	-	-	83	84	83	80
Baby-boomers	-	-	75	78	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	-	59	65	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	43	52	-	-	-	-	-
Period: Summer/Winter							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	78	82	84	84	83	80
Baby-boomers	63	71	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	51	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 6c. Predicted Turnout According to Age, Generation, Period and Education, 1968-2000

	Age						
	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
Better Educated							
Period Pre-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	85	88	89	90	89	87
Baby-boomers	74	80	83	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	63	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Period Post-1990							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	-	-	90	90	89	88
Baby-boomers	-	-	84	86	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	-	72	76	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	58	66	-	-	-	-	-
Period: Summer/Winter							
Pre-baby-boomers	-	80	84	86	86	85	83
Baby-boomers	67	74	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1960s	55	-	-	-	-	-	-
Generation 1970s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 7. Logit Analysis of the Impact of Some Demographic Characteristics on the Propensity to Vote, 1968-2000

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable : Vote Participation	
	B	(s.e.)
Age	.0501*	(.0075)
Age^2	-.0004*	(.0001)
Baby-boomer	-.1946*	(.0620)
Generation 1960s	-.5837*	(.0866)
Generation 1970s	-.8253*	(.1222)
Period post-1990	-.6427*	(.0581)
Summer/Winter	-.4060*	(.0463)
Lesser Educated	-.5855*	(.0431)
Middle Educated	.0510	(.0655)
Better Educated x Post-1990	.4836*	(.1036)
Male	.0665	(.0351)
Union member	.1197*	(.0364)
Religiosity	.4483*	(.0484)
Atlantic	-.0196	(.0673)
Quebec	-.0390	(.0458)
West	-.1608*	(.0426)
Foreign born	-.1525*	(.0515)
Non-European origin	-.2711*	(.0804)
Married	.2429*	(.0406)
Income	.6212*	(.0626)
Constant	-.3484	(.1993)
N	18 768	
Pseudo R^2	.0828	
Log likelihood	-10164.068	

*: p<.01